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Helping people help themselves:
Insights from behavioral economics for
policies to counter addiction
Insights from behavioral economics have the potential to generate novel interventions
and polices as well as increase the effectiveness of standard prescriptions. Here we
discuss approaches to address addictions. These insights hinge on leveraging decision-
making biases to help people overcome mistakes. Examples of these strategies include
changing the presentation of information, restructuring incentives, and providing
opportunities for precommitment. Rigorously testing different policy ideas is key to
putting them into practice.
* Les auteurs adhèrent à
la charte de déontologie du LIEPP,
disponible en ligne, et n'ont déclaré
aucun conflit d'intérêt potentiel.
jody.sindelar@yale.edu Les apports de l'économie comportementale permettent de concevoir de nouvelles
formes d’action publique et d'augmenter l'efficacité des recommandations habituelles.
Nous discutons ici de l’utilité de ces approches pour traiter la toxicomanie. Ces modèles
reposent sur les biais cognitifs intervenant dans la prise de décision pour aider les gens à
éviter de commettre des erreurs. Des exemples de ces stratégies consistent à modifier la
présentation de l'information, à transformer les incitations, et à offrir des possibilités de
pré-engagement. Il est essentiel de tester rigoureusement ces différentes stratégies






insights from psychology and economics to
take systematic biases into account when
analyzing decision-making by individuals.
Neoclassical economics ignores many of
these biases to make analysis of economic
decisions will be more tractable. But
behavioral economics recognizes that some
decisions are systematically more likely to
suffer from biases, and that taking these
biases into account will likely make public
policies more effective (World Bank, 2015).
This policy brief examines some new
frontiers in behavioral economics that can
be applied to addiction policy
2. Tempting Goods
One area where systematic biases are
most severe is decision-making relating to
‘tempting goods’, or those goods where self-
control is needed to resist the temptation to
consume. In contrast, for most goods, self-
control is not a key factor. Self-control is
not needed to avoid consuming too many
pencils or glasses of water, for example.
Addictive substances and activities
are special cases of tempting goods.
Addictive substances can produce a
compulsion to use more of the goods over
time. Addicts can develop tolerance and
withdrawal symptoms when they try to quit
or cut-down. Some addictive substances can
result in serious physical, neurological,
psychological and social harm. Addiction is
not limited to substances but can extend to
activities as well. For example, compulsive
gamblers also exhibit signs of addiction.
Addicts continue to consume more
of the addictive substance than they say
they want to. For example, many smokers in
the United States say they want to quit,
many try to quit, and some succeed only to
restart smoking. In the morning, people
want to drink less, but at happy hour they
are unable to resist temptation, and then when
they get home they regret what they did. One way
to think about these ‘two minds’ of addiction is
that people have “Hot” and “Cold” periods: a
cold, slow, deliberative period, versus a hot, fast,
instinctual period. They may decide, in the “cold”
period, that they want to reduce consumption, but
when they find themselves in a “hot” period,
perhaps due to external cues, they are unable to
resist (Bernheim & Rangel, 2004).
3. Neoclassical and Behavioral
Economics and Public Policy
According to neoclassical economics, one
justification for government intervention is a
market failure. In the case of addiction, there are
two key potential market failures: imperfect
information and externalities. There are standard
policy prescriptions for both of these market
failures. These policies are often at least partially
effective, but there are gaps in their effectiveness
that might be filled by ideas from behavioral
economics.
There are two insights from behavioral
economics that are particularly important in the
case of addiction: imperfect information
processing and limited self-control. Imperfect
information processing means that people do not
and cannot notice and objectively process all of
the information available to them. Thus people use
rules to simplify the process, but this can lead to
systematic biases.
Self-control limitations are modeled in
economics as time-inconsistency or hyperbolic
discounting. Both perspectives yield, for example,
that the optimal time to start a diet is always
“tomorrow” – but tomorrow never arrives.
Psychologists might consider self-control to be
something akin to willpower. In the both
disciplines, the concept is critical in many
decisions.
4. Information
Neoclassical Economics and Information
Neoclassical economics is sensitive to the
problem of imperfect information: if people do
not have good information, they will not be able to
reach their preferred choices. Imperfect
information justifies a policy of improving
information on the harms of drug consumption
and requiring truth in advertising.
Behavioral Economics and Information
In addition to considering whether
information is available, behavioral economics
takes into account that people do not absorb and
process available information perfectly. Thus
behavioral economics is concerned with making
information salient, motivating and easy to use.
Recent studies from the fields of
psychology and economics have shown that
framing can be very important. Framing is
changing the perspective with which people
approach a choice. For example, people may make
a different choice depending on whether an option
is described as a gain or a loss, while the magnitude
of the option remains the same. In the context of
addiction, a message that seeks to persuade people
not to smoke emphasizing the health benefits from
quitting may be more (or less) powerful than the
message emphasizing health losses of not quitting.
Alternatively, the message could shift the frame
entirely by emphasizing financial benefits,
increasing people’s attention to the message
(Sindelar and O’Malley, 2014).
Some studies have shown that reminders
(for example, through text messaging) can be
helpful when people are trying to change their
behavior (e.g., see Free et al, 2011). In the case of
addiction, sending targeted, salient, reminders may
help people resist the temptation of an addictive
good.
5. Incentives
Neoclassical Economics and Incentives
Externalities occur when the cost (or
benefit) of an action is borne (or enjoyed) at least
in part by someone who is not taking the action.
For example, a negative externality of smoking is
that the smoke harms those nearby and increases
their respiratory problems through passive smoke.
Figure 1 shows the cost of health care for
tobacco-related illnesses as a percent of GDP for
selected countries. The standard neoclassical
economics policy prescription for externalities is to
“internalize the externality” by taxing to increase
the cost to consumers of a harmful good or
action; or subsidizing to decrease the cost of a
beneficial good or action, like quitting. Thus
Figure 1: Percent of GDP spent on tobacco-related illness: One dimension of externalities of
tobacco use is spending on healthcare for those suffering from tobacco-related illnesses. For
some countries, this burden is quite high. Sources: GDP, 2010: World Development Indicators,
World Bank. Estimates of both private and public direct medical costs of treating tobacco-related
illnesses: Eriksen et al, 2012.
countries often impose high taxes on cigarettes
and alcohol, and provide free (subsidized)
resources for those trying to quit. However these
policies produce gaps – in particular, high taxes
may not stop those smokers with severe self-
control problems from smoking. Thus some
people with low self-control are harmed – rather
than helped – by a tax as they continue to smoke
but pay more. As those with low income are more
likely to smoke, at least in the U.S., this can have
adverse distributional impacts (Remler, 2004).
Behavioral Economics and Incentives
Behavioral economics builds on and
improves the neoclassical intervention of
incentives by focusing on the salience, structure,
timing, and delivery mechanism of the incentive. A
series of studies has found that quite small
financial payments can have a very large effect on
drug users’ and smokers’ ability to quit if they are
carefully structured. This is especially impressive
when one considers that, given the benefits of
quitting, a sophisticated addict could “pay” herself
to quit. Behavioral economics gives several ideas
on how policymakers might increase the
effectiveness of incentives:
i. Increase the salience: A tax’s salience (not just
the size) changes how well it will work: People may
not respond to incentives if they do not notice
them, so if the tax is highly visible, it may work
better to change behavior (Chetty et al., 2009).
ii. Use lotteries: People have a tendency to
overweight low probability outcomes. This means,
for example, that people may respond more to a
5% chance of winning $100 than getting $5 for
sure (even though the expected value is the same).
Therefore, for a fixed budget available to spend on
incentives, offering incentives on a probabilistic
basis may be more effective per dollar.
iii. Take advantage of loss aversion: Loss
aversion is a bias where people feel worse when
they lose something they already have than when
they miss an opportunity to win the same thing.
That is, people tend to be more motivated to avoid
losing $10 than by prospect of gaining $10. This
bias can be incorporated into an incentive
structure to make the incentive more effective
(Alessi and Petry, 2014). Regret has also been used
in lotteries to increase compliance with weight-loss
regimes. Those trying to lose weight are entered
into a lottery in which a name is draw for the price,
but if the winning person has not completed the
weight lose activity required for a prize, she forfeits
the prize This approach has been shown to be
effective in weight lose and adherence to
medication; they may also be effective in
structuring incentives for quitting addictive
behavior (Volpp et al, 2008).
iv. Provide immediate benefits: People tend to
be present-biased and time inconsistent, so they
will put off the pain of quitting until tomorrow,
but tomorrow never comes. Because the benefits
of quitting are greatest in the future, providing
incentives earlier – even small ones – can help
encourage people to take their desired action
earlier. Thus incentives that are contingent on the
process of quitting in addition to paying on the
outcome, might be helpful.
6. New and Different Tools from
Behavioral Economics
Some of the most interesting approaches
from behavioral economics are absent from, and
even contradictory to, neoclassical economics. Pre-
commitment devices allow people to prevent their
‘future selves’ from making the decision that they
now wish that would not make in the future. This
voluntary commitment occurs in a “Cold” present
period and it binds the future self from making
more rash decisions in a future “Hot” period. In
order to make the commitment, the person must
realize his own self-control problem. The naïve
person will think he will be able to resist the
temptation even though she has failed before.
Addicts can pre-commit by taking action
today to prevent future addictive behavior (or at
least make it very difficult). The Voluntary
Exclusion Programs for gamblers is a good
example. A compulsive gambler can put her name
on a ‘no-entry’ list at a casino during a “Cold”
period, so that during a “Hot” period, they will not
be able to gamble as the casino will not let them in.
Smaller serving sizes can also be thought of
as a pre-commitment device. In an online
experiment, when given a choice, many smokers
preferred smaller pack sizes, even at a 25% price
premium, and some explained that it was so that
they could reduce future opportunities to smoke.
Similarly, smaller serving sizes have been shown to
reduce food consumption. Governments could
limit the allowable size of sugary soft drinks as
well as the pack size. Both of these highlight issues
around libertarian paternalism – policies that push
people toward healthy behavior (World Bank,
2015).
Pharmacological pre-commitment devices
are a clear example of how people can limit future
intake. There are drugs that will make someone
feel ill if they drink alcohol. A person can take an
anti-alcohol drug in the morning, during a “Cold”
period to prevent themselves from drinking after
work (when they know they will be in a “Hot”
period).
Finally, new and interesting literature shows
that financial pre-commitments have great
potential. Using these devices, people bet their
own money that they can improve their behavior:
they put some money in an account and agree that
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if they have not quit at a specific point, they will
lose their money (Gine, Karlan, and Zinman,
2010). People in the United States have voluntarily
put over $18,000,000 on the line as pre-
commitment devices to help them meet their goals
on StickK, a private sector website. This shows
that there are a substantial number of people who
are sophisticated about their self-control issues and
eager for a mechanism to help them achieve their
goals.
7. Concrete opportunities for
behavioral economics insights to
inspire policies
Opportunities for Pre-commitment:
Providing people with opportunities to pre-
commit may be helpful. For example, the
government could subsidize the development and
availability of precommitments (such as the drugs
discussed above), or borrow ideas from private
sector initiatives like StickK.
More and Smarter Incentives: Making
incentives salient, and using more financial
incentives in treatment programs, and structuring
them with loss aversion, lotteries, and a focus on
process as well as outcomes may yield substantial
gains.
Messaging and Reminders as Public and
Private Policy. As indicated above, text messaging
is an approach that is now feasible due to the low
cost of testing and the ubiquity of cell phones. It
would be relatively cheap to provide programs
where people could enroll to receive text
reminders to help them through their “Hot”
periods, and this may help many people change
their behavior.
Establish ‘Nudge Units’: The UK, Australia,
and the U.S. have established units to test and use
findings and insights from behavioral economics
to improve policies and regulations. Other
countries could consider this as well.
Test and Evaluate Rigorously: Rigorous
testing including, randomized treatment
assignment, can help identify the most effective
policies and unanticipated side effects, as well as
modifications to existing policies. For example, a
large ongoing randomized field study is examining
the effectiveness of financial incentives in helping
low income smokers (Medicaid recipients) stop
smoking in the U.S.
References
Alessi, S. and N. Petry (2014). Smoking Reductions and
Increased Self-efficacy in a Randomized Controlled Trial
of Smoking Abstinence-Contingent Incentives in
Residential Substance Abuse Treatment Patients. Official
Journal of the Society for Research on Nicotine and
Tobacco.
Bernheim, B. D., and Rangel, A. (2004). Addiction and cue-
triggered decision processes.?American Economic Review,
1558-1590.
Chetty, R., A. Looney and K. Kroft (2009). “Salience and
Taxation: Theory and Evidence.” American Economic
Review, 99(4): 1145-77.
Eriksen M, Mackay J, Ross H. (2012) The Tobacco Atlas.
Fourth Ed. Atlanta, GA: American Cancer Society;; New
York, NY: World Lung Foundation. Also available at
www.TobaccoAtlas.org).
Free C., et al. (2011) Smoking Cessation Support Delivered via
Mobile Phone Text Messaging (text2stop): A Single-blind,
Randomized Trial.?Lancet, 378(9785):49-55.
Giné, X., D. Karlan and J. Zinman (2010). Put your money
where your butt is: a commitment contract for smoking
cessation. American Economic Journal: Applied
Economics 2:213-235.
Remler, D. (2004). Poor smokers, poor quitters, and cigarette
tax regressivity. American Journal of Public Health 94.2:
225-229.
Sindelar, J., B. Elbel and N. Petry (2007). What do we get for
our money? Cost-effectiveness of adding contingency
management. Addiction 102(2):309-16.
Sindelar, J. and S. O’Malley (2014). “Financial versus health
motivation to quit smoking: a randomized field study.”
Preventive Medicine, 59: 1-4.
Volpp, K. G., et al. (2008). Financial incentive–based
approaches for weight loss: a randomized
trial.?Jama,?300(22), 2631-2637.
World Bank (2015). World Development Report 2015: Mind,
Society, and Behavior. Washington, DC: World Bank. doi:
10.1596/978-1-4648-0342-0.
4
Figure 2: Probabilistic Incentives: Weeks absent from drug use for differential
payments by treatment groups: no payments, lower probability payments, and higher
probability payments..
